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The End of Umpire? Federalism and
Judicial Restraint
Bruce Ryder*

I. THE TURN TO JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
The Supreme Court of Canada released eight decisions in 2005 that
dealt with challenges to the validity of legislation based on the division
of powers in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.1 Not since
1983, before Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 cases
dominated its constitutional docket, has the Court decided so many
federalism cases in a single year.
In the 2005 decisions, the judges were united around an approach to
federalism disputes that the Court has consolidated over the past 15
years. With the exception of a lone justice in one case,3 in 2005 the
Court was unanimous in affirming the validity and operation of the eight
statutes challenged on division of powers grounds. A consistent posture
of judicial restraint — or generous interpretations of the scope of both
provincial and federal legislative jurisdiction — has been the defining
feature of the Court’s recent federalism jurisprudence.
The consensus on the current Court that declarations of ultra vires
on federalism grounds should be issued rarely — with “extreme
caution” in Patrick Monahan’s words4 — has been developing for two
*
1
2

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
3
Castillo v. Castillo, [2005] S.C.J. No. 68, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 870, Bastarache J. concurring.
4
Patrick Monahan, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Canadian Federalism, 19962001” in P. Thibault, B. Pelletier & L. Perret, eds., Les mélanges Gérald-A. Beaudoin: Les défis du
constitutionnalisme 353 (Cowansville, Que.: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2002). Monahan concludes his
study by observing that “… the current Court regards federalism as a political arrangement
designed to facilitate the achievement by provincial majorities of collective goals. This suggests an
attitude of extreme caution on the part of the current Court before it rules provincial legislation
invalid.” Id., at 366. I would add that this attitude of extreme caution is even more evident in the
challenges to federal statutes that reach the Court. Together with the Court’s expansion of the
paramountcy rule, and its increased resort to the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine to restrict the
operation of provincial statutes, the Court appears even more concerned with facilitating the
achievement of collective goals by the federal government.
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decades. The Lamer Court was not shy about developing separation of
powers doctrine5 or unwritten constitutional principles6 to place novel
limits on the exercise of government power. But when it came to the
division of powers, the Lamer Court exercised its power of judicial
review in the direction of upholding challenged statutes, whether
provincial or federal. The McLachlin Court, emphatically and usually
unanimously, has continued this trend.
Can anyone remember the last time the Court declared a statute
ultra vires as an invasion of the other level of government’s exclusive
jurisdiction in section 91 or 92? The last time a provincial law was
declared invalid on federalism grounds was in the 1993 Morgentaler
case,7 when Nova Scotia abortion regulations were found to be an
invasion of the federal criminal law power. As for federal statutes, apart
from an inconsequential provision of the proposed Civil Marriage Act
that the Court said would be ultra vires in the Same-Sex Marriage
Reference,8 one has to go back more than two decades, to the early
1980s, to find the Court declaring a federal statute ultra vires on
division of powers grounds.9 In short, when adjudicating federalism
disputes, the Lamer and McLachlin Courts have followed the path of

5
E.g., Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward
Island, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter “Provincial Judges Reference”];
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, [1996] S.C.J. No. 83, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 1048.
6
Provincial Judges Reference, id.; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No.
61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 [hereinafter “Secession Reference”].
7
R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] S.C.J. No. 95, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463. Of course, provincial
statutes may be declared invalid for violating provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867 other than the
division of powers. For example, in Re Eurig Estate, [1998] S.C.J. No. 72, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 565, a
provincial regulation authorizing probate fees was found to be a valid exercise of provincial taxing
powers pursuant to s. 92(2), but was invalidated on the grounds it was not authorized by the
legislature as required by ss. 53 and 90.
8
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 [hereinafter
“Same-Sex Marriage Reference”]. The Court affirmed Parliament’s ability to pass legislation
defining marriage, for civil purposes, as the union of two persons to the exclusion of all others. The
second provision of the Proposed Act, a declaratory provision stating that “[n]othing in the Act
would affect the freedom of officials of religious groups to refuse to perform marriages that are not
in accordance with their religious beliefs,” was found to be in relation to the solemnization of
marriage, a matter within provincial jurisdiction pursuant to s. 92(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867,
and thus ultra vires Parliament. Id., at paras. 35-39.
9
See, e.g., Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Mackenzie, [1982] S.C.J. No. 58, [1982] 2
S.C.R. 9 (severing invalid portion of Criminal Code provision); Reference re Proposed Federal Tax
on Exported Natural Gas, [1982] S.C.J. No. 52, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 1004 (part of proposed federal Bill
ruled ultra vires).
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judicial restraint to a degree that is unprecedented in the Supreme
Court’s history.10
A great deal of Canadian constitutional scholarship takes for granted
the importance and necessity of judges taking on the role of umpires of
Canadian federalism. Without a neutral umpire to adjudicate disputes
regarding the division of legislative powers, the argument goes, the
constitution’s commitment to the federal principle would not be
secured.11 Others, like Paul Weiler, have argued that we would be better
off if the courts did not enforce the constitutional division of powers at
all (apart from asserting federal paramountcy where necessary) and
simply left it to the politically accountable actors to determine the scope
of their respective law-making powers.12 The Court’s disinclination,
since the early 1980s, to issue declarations of invalidity on division of
powers grounds brings its current practices close to Weiler’s views. The
Court appears to be reaching the “end of umpire”, preferring to leave the
definition of jurisdictional boundaries to governments.
A closer look at the Court’s federalism jurisprudence reveals a more
complicated situation than simple judicial restraint in division of powers
cases. The Court has almost entirely abandoned, for more than two
decades, the use of declarations of ultra vires to police the division of
powers. Over the same period, however, the Court has demonstrated an
increased willingness to invoke the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine
and the paramountcy doctrine to limit the application and operation of
provincial statutes. These decidedly one-sided doctrines serve to limit
10
Patrick Monahan, in his study of the Court’s federalism decisions from 1950 to 1984,
found that the percentages of statutes challenged on federalism grounds held to be ultra vires
ranged from a low of 20 per cent in the 1960s to over 40 per cent in the 1950s and from 1980-84.
See Patrick Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the Supreme
Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 152. While I am not aware of any published data
covering the entire post-1984 period since Monahan’s study, it is clear that the percentage of
challenged statutes held to be ultra vires on federalism grounds has plummeted since the early
1980s. See Monahan, supra, note 4, for an analysis of the case law from 1996 to 2001.
11
For an insightful discussion of the umpire metaphor as a description and ideal of the
Court’s role in federalism cases, see Donna Greschner, “The Supreme Court, Federalism and
Metaphors of Moderation” (2001) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 47. Wayne MacKay has argued that the umpire
metaphor obscures the political nature of constitutional decision-making and the creative role that
the judges play in formulating the rules of federalism. See A. Wayne MacKay, “The Supreme Court
and Federalism: Does/Should Anyone Care Anymore?” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 241.
12
Paul Weiler, In the Last Resort: A Critical Study of The Supreme Court of Canada
(Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1974). In his provocative chapter entitled “The Umpire of Canadian
Federalism”, Weiler argued that “federalism cases involve essentially non-legal conflicts which will
not be dealt with very successfully in the judicial process, and that courts should avoid the area
unless their intervention is absolutely vital”. Id., at 174.
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provincial legislative powers, but have no impact on federal legislative
powers. The Court’s recent record in federalism disputes is thus a mix
of judicial restraint and activism: restraint regarding declarations of
invalidity, and activism when it comes to reading down or suspending
provincial statutes.

II. THE SUPREME COURT’S THEORY OF FEDERALISM
The Court’s federalism decisions in 2005 involved a range of important
federal and provincial laws. For the first time, the Court upheld the
validity of the federal Trade-marks Act, and its “passing off” civil
remedy, relying on an expansive interpretation of the trade and
commerce power.13 Reversing the Quebec Court of Appeal, it found that
the maternity and parental leave provisions of the federal Employment
Insurance Act fell within a large and progressive interpretation of the
federal power to make laws in relation to unemployment insurance.14
The Court was equally generous in its interpretation of the scope of
provincial jurisdiction. It gave effect to Saskatchewan’s prohibition on
retail displays of tobacco products,15 applied Quebec labour statutes to a
bankrupt employer,16 upheld the ability of a Quebec marketing statute to
regulate the production of chickens destined for sale outside of the
province,17 affirmed Quebec’s ability to regulate the colour of imported
margarine sold in the province,18 suggested in obiter dicta that an
Alberta limitations statute could apply to civil actions arising in foreign
jurisdictions,19 and upheld British Columbia’s novel legislation altering

13
Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 66, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302
[hereinafter “Kirkbi”]. Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13.
14
Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57,
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 669 [hereinafter “Employment Insurance Reference”].
15
Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] S.C.J. No. 1, [2005] 1 S.C.R.
188 [hereinafter “Rothmans”].
16
D.I.M.S. Construction Inc. (Trustee of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No.
52, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 564.
17
Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, [2005] S.C.J. No. 19,
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 292 [hereinafter “Pelland”].
18
UL Canada Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 11, [2005] 1 S.C.R.
143 [hereinafter “UL Canada”].
19
Castillo v. Castillo, supra, note 3.
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the rules of civil liability and civil procedure in actions against tobacco
manufacturers.20
This unusually high number of decisions affords us ample sources
— relatively rare in the Charter era — to discern the understanding of
federalism that is animating the Supreme Court’s decision-making. This
task, however, is complicated by the Court’s reticence in recent division
of powers cases — in contrast to its celebrated opinions in the
Patriation Reference21 and the Secession Reference22 — to discuss the
nature of Canadian federalism at any length. Indeed, it sometimes
appears that the Supreme Court’s theory of federalism is that it has no
theory.
The Court has found little need to recognize the distinctiveness of
its approach or to express its views on such issues as the relative merits
of centralization versus decentralization, unity versus diversity, or
exclusivity versus concurrency. Indeed, Deschamps J., speaking on
behalf of the Court in the Employment Insurance Reference, cast doubt
on whether the Court could unite around a particular view of Canadian
federalism. In an unusually candid and revealing passage, she wrote as
follows:
To derive the evolution of constitutional powers from the structure of
Canada is delicate, as what that structure is will often depend on a
given court’s view of what federalism is. What are regarded as the
characteristic features of federalism may vary from one judge to
another, and will be based on political rather than legal notions. The
task of maintaining the balance between federal and provincial powers
falls primarily to governments. If an issue comes before a court, the
court must refer to the framers’ description of the power in order to
identify its essential components, and must be guided by the way in
which courts have interpreted the power in the past. In this area, the
meaning of the words used may be adapted to modern-day realities, in
a manner consistent with the separation of powers of the executive,
legislative and judicial branches.23

20
British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] S.C.J. No. 50, [2005] 2
S.C.R. 473 [hereinafter “Imperial Tobacco”].
21
Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981] 1
S.C.R. 753.
22
Supra, note 6.
23
Supra, note 14, at para. 10.
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Justice Deschamps’ description of the Court’s role is fascinating. It
seems to cast doubt on the ability of the judges to agree on a theory of
federalism, and yet simultaneously puts forward important judicial
ingredients of just such a theory. In the end, with all due respect,
Deschamps J. takes too modest a view of the judicial role. As several
generations of constitutional scholars have emphasized, the text (“the
framers’ description of the power”) and precedents (“the way in which
courts have interpreted the power in the past”) do not determine results
in particular cases. The characterization of the subject matter of laws,
and their allocation to particular heads of power, are value-laden
exercises that involve a degree of judicial choice.24 As a result, the Court
inevitably plays a creative and significant role in the evolution of
Canadian federalism.25 The Court’s decisions are guided by the
constitutional text and past precedents, to be sure, but ultimately the
Court must also make value choices about how the constitutional
division of powers should help give shape to the federation.
Justice Deschamps’ remarks were the most perceptive and candid
issued by the Court in its 2005 federalism decisions. More typically, the
Court tends to eschew explicit normative or theoretical discussion in
division of powers cases. But I would argue that an immanent theory of
federalism resides within the Court’s jurisprudence. The features of the
Court’s theory of federalism can be cobbled together from what the
Court has said and done in division of powers cases. I would suggest
that the following six propositions capture the essence of the Court’s
approach to the interpretation of the division of powers:
1. Judicial interpretation of the constitution is partly and unavoidably
subjective. Care should be taken to ensure that subjective judicial
views do not thwart laws enacted by democratically accountable
legislatures. Democracy is promoted by generous and flexible
interpretations of both federal and provincial legislative powers. The
primary responsibility for the maintenance of an appropriate balance
between federal and provincial powers lies with the politically
accountable branches of government.26

24
See, e.g., Bora Laskin, “Tests for the Validity of Legislation: What’s the Matter?”
(1955) 11 U.T.L.J. 114; W.R. Lederman, “Classification of Laws and the British North America
Act” in Continuing Canadian Constitutional Dilemmas 229 (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981); Peter
W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), at chapter 15.5(g).
25
For a recent elaboration of this theme, see A. Wayne MacKay, supra, note 11.
26
Employment Insurance Reference, per Deschamps J., supra, note 14.
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2. A large measure of judicial restraint should be exercised before laws
are declared ultra vires on division of powers grounds, especially
where jurisdictional conflict is absent or where governments have
worked together to forge a cooperative legislative solution.
Legislation should be declared ultra vires only when the enacting
legislature has exceeded the boundaries of its jurisdiction in a
manner that blatantly disregards the jurisprudence.27
3. It is particularly important that the courts permit the growth of
federal legislative power through broad and dynamic interpretations
of federal heads of power.28
4. The growth of de facto areas of concurrent jurisdiction should be
welcomed. Overlap and interaction of federal and provincial powers
should be tolerated and even promoted as an inevitable aspect of a
modern, federal state.29
5. Exclusive federal powers deserve greater protection from provincial
incursion than exclusive provincial powers do from federal

27

Id. See also Pelland, supra, note 17.
The Court has not stated this proposition explicitly, but it is supported by its interpretive
practices. The Court has issued generous interpretations of a number of federal heads of power,
many of which pushed these powers beyond their traditional parameters. See, for example, the
Employment Insurance Reference, supra, note 14, regarding the unemployment insurance power in
s. 91(2A); the Same-Sex Marriage Reference, supra, note 8, regarding the marriage power in
s. 91(26); R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401
regarding the national concern branch of the peace, order and good government power; General
Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing Ltd., [1989] S.C.J. No. 28, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 and
Kirkbi, supra, note 13, regarding the general regulation of trade branch of s. 91(2); and, perhaps
most dramatically, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68,
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199. R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] S.C.J. No. 76, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 and Reference
re the Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] S.C.J. No. 31, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783, regarding the criminal law
power in s. 91(27). Assessing the latter three rulings, Peter Hogg has written that Parliament “can
do much more with its criminal law power than we imagined 50 years ago, or even 10 years ago”.
Peter W. Hogg, “The Expansion of the Federal Power Over Criminal Law” in P. Thibault, B.
Pelletier and L. Perret, eds., supra, note 4, 233 at 240. The Court’s rulings have not resulted in
similarly dramatic expansion of the scope of provincial heads of power. Jean Leclair has argued
that the weight the Court accords to functional efficiency explains its tendency to strengthen the
powers of the central government at the expense of regional diversity: see Jean Leclair, “The
Supreme Court of Canada’s Understanding of Federalism: Efficiency at the Expense of Diversity”
(2003) 28 Queen’s L.J. 411.
29
Ontario (Attorney General) v. OPSEU, [1987] S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 18.
The tolerance of overlap and interplay between federal and provincial powers was evident in many
of the 2005 decisions that upheld provincial or federal statutes despite their significant effects on
subject matters within the other level of government’s exclusive jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kirkbi,
supra, note 13; Employment Insurance Reference, supra, note 14; Pelland, supra, note 17; UL
Canada, supra, note 18; Imperial Tobacco, supra, note 20.
28
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incursion. The interjurisdictional immunity should be used to
prevent provincial laws from applying to matters at the core of
federal jurisdiction; no similar principle prevents federal laws from
applying to matters at the core of provincial jurisdiction.30
6. The primacy of federal legislative policies must be protected by a
broad interpretation of the federal paramountcy rule.31
The trend towards judicial restraint regarding declarations of ultra
vires is a product of the Court giving effect to the first four postulates
outlined above. The final two points give primacy to federal areas of
jurisdiction or federal legislative policies, resulting in a trend towards
increased judicial restriction of the permissible scope of application or
operation of validly enacted provincial statutes.
In the balance of the paper, I will describe how the Court’s approach
to federalism cases outlined above was consolidated in its 2005
decisions. The Court gave expansive interpretations to federal powers
(Part III below) and applied established interpretations of provincial
powers in a flexible and generous manner (Part IV). It also confirmed its
willingness to use the federal paramountcy rule to protect the primacy of
federal legislative objectives (Part V). In the concluding section, Part
VI, I will argue that the Court’s theory of federalism is laudable from
the point of view of the democratic principle, but has more contradictory
and problematic implications that may pose a threat to the federal
principle in the long run.

30
For applications of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine to read down provincial
statutes, see Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] S.C.J. No. 84, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437; Commission de
transport de la communauté urbaine de Québec v. Canada (National Battlefields Commission),
[1990] S.C.J. No. 90, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 838; Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la
sécurité du travail), [1988] S.C.J. No. 41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749. The Court has declined to apply the
interjurisdictional immunity doctrine in a reciprocal manner to protect provincial heads of power
from federal incursion. See, e.g., Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of
Transport), [1992] S.C.J. No. 1, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3; Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations
Board), [1993] S.C.J. No. 99, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327; Alberta Government Telephones v. Canada
(Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission), [1989] S.C.J. No. 84, [1989] 2
S.C.R. 225.
31
The Court has not stated this proposition explicitly, but it flows from its reasoning in
Rothmans, supra, note 15, at paras. 11-14. See also Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] S.C.J. No. 9,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 121, at 155; Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, [2001] S.C.J. No. 66,
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 113, at paras. 69-70.
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III. EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL POWERS
The Court upheld the two federal statutes that were challenged in 2005,
and did so by broadly interpreting the federal legislative powers at stake.
1. Employment Insurance Reference
The Employment Insurance Reference32 was the one federalism case in
2005 in which a provincial government and the federal government
clashed over a matter of jurisdiction. In conformity with a familiar
pattern in Canadian federalism, the federal government prevailed in the
courts, while Quebec’s position was accommodated politically through
intergovernmental negotiations.
At issue in the Employment Insurance Reference were the
provisions of the federal Employment Insurance Act that confer
maternity and parental benefits on eligible employees. The Quebec
government initiated the reference after establishing its own Parental
Insurance Plan in 2001, taking the position that the legislative provision
of maternity and parental benefits falls within exclusive provincial
jurisdiction pursuant to section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867. In
a unanimous ruling, the Quebec Court of Appeal agreed, striking down
sections 22 and 23 of the Employment Insurance Act. The Supreme
Court allowed the appeal, unanimously affirming the validity of the
challenged federal provisions.
The competing approaches taken by the two Courts to the
interpretation of the federal power to make laws in relation to
unemployment insurance pursuant to section 91(2A) of the Constitution
Act, 1867 make for a stark and fascinating contrast.
The Quebec Court of Appeal favoured a “mini-compact theory” that
focused on the nature of the bargain made between the federal
government and the provinces in 1940 when the Constitution was
amended to give the federal government jurisdiction over
unemployment insurance. For the Quebec Court of Appeal, the starting
point was the protection of provincial jurisdiction over social policy:
“these are measures which normally fall within provincial
jurisdiction.”33 In the Court’s view, the degree of subtraction from
32

Supra, note 14.
Reference re Sections 22 and 23 of the Employment Insurance Act (Canada), [2004]
J.Q. No. 277, 245 D.L.R. (4th) 515, at 527 (C.A.).
33

354

Supreme Court Law Review

(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d)

provincial jurisdiction accomplished by the 1940 amendment should be
limited strictly to the intent of the governments that negotiated that
agreement. The Court thus accorded “primary importance”34 to the
evidence from the time suggesting that “unemployment insurance” was
limited to an insurance scheme for earnings lost “for economic reasons”
and not “for reasons based on personal circumstances”.35 Reliance on the
“living tree” metaphor would be inappropriate, the Court said, because it
would constitute a betrayal of the agreement regarding the limited
jurisdiction transferred by the provinces to the federal Parliament with
the enactment of section 91(2A). In the Court’s view, expansion of
federal powers should take place only with provincial consent through
the constitutional amending procedure. In conclusion, the Court wrote,
… the sections constitute an encroachment by the Canadian
Parliament into a field which is reserved for the provinces, whereas no
constitutional amendment has been enacted since 1940 which allows
this. In the absence of any such amendment, I cannot see how one can
set aside the consensus which was reached in order to add s. 91(2A) to
the Constitution Act, 1867, a consensus which was based upon a
highly restricted definition of the expression employment insurance.36

In allowing the appeal, and affirming the validity of the challenged
provisions, the Supreme Court rejected the “mini-compact theory”
adopted by the Quebec Court of Appeal. The starting point for the
Supreme Court was not the preservation of provincial jurisdiction over
social programs, or a strict interpretation of the 1940 amendment, but a
generous and dynamic interpretation of federal power. Justice
Deschamps, writing for a unanimous Court, chastised the Quebec Court
of Appeal for placing such great weight on historical evidence of
“original intent”. While debates at the time are relevant, they cannot be
treated as conclusive, Deschamps J. wrote, for the Court takes a
progressive or dynamic approach to the interpretation of constitutional
language.37
The same type of contest — between original intent and the need to
update constitutional powers to meet changing social meanings and

34
35
36
37

Id., at 528.
Id., at 543.
Id., at 551-52.
Supra, note 14, at para. 9.
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needs — arose in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference.38 Just as the
Attorney General of Quebec in the Employment Insurance Reference
argued that “unemployment insurance” had a fixed meaning, some
intervenors argued that the meaning of marriage was fixed according to
historical understandings limiting it to opposite-sex unions. The Court
disagreed:
The “frozen concepts” reasoning runs contrary to one of the most
fundamental principles of Canadian constitutional interpretation: that
our Constitution is a living tree which, by way of progressive
interpretation, accommodates and addresses the realities of modern
life. … A large and liberal, or progressive, interpretation ensures the
continued relevance and, indeed, legitimacy of Canada’s constituting
document. By way of progressive interpretation our Constitution
succeeds in its ambitious enterprise, that of structuring the exercise of
power by the organs of the state in times vastly different from those in
which it was crafted.39

Once the words of the Constitution are unhinged from original
intent, and their meaning is freed to change with the times, the Court
must face the formidable challenge of developing a methodology for
ascertaining the limits of any particular federal or provincial head of
power. In an impressive discussion that makes a considerable
contribution to the jurisprudence, Deschamps J. confronted this difficult
problem head on. Quoting Henri Brun and Guy Tremblay, she argued
that the “essential elements” of a head of power can be identified by
reference to the text and original intent, and then, within the confines of
those essential elements, a generous and progressive interpretation can
be guided by evolving social needs.40
Applying this approach, Deschamps J. concluded that the essential
elements of unemployment insurance are that it is a public insurance
plan aimed at preserving economic security by paying temporary
income replacement benefits in the event of an interruption of
employment.41 As labour market conditions evolve, so may the scope of
38

Supra, note 8.
Id., at paras. 22-23.
40
Employment Insurance Reference, supra, note 14, at paras. 36, 44-46 and 76. There is a
great deal of judicial discretion in the identification of essential elements and evolving social needs,
to be sure. But one cannot banish elements of subjectivity from any approach to constitutional
interpretation. Justice Deschamps’ approach provides a principled structure to the process of
dynamic interpretation.
41
Id., at para. 48.
39
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federal jurisdiction. She then undertook a historical review of changes in
the nature of employment, including women’s increased participation in
the labour force since 1940. She concluded that the maternity and
parental benefits at issue are, in pith and substance, a mechanism for
providing replacement income when employment is interrupted that
respond to contemporary workplace realities. Thus, they fall within the
essential elements of the federal power.
Justice Deschamps’ powerful ruling results in Parliament and the
provincial legislatures having overlapping jurisdiction to make laws in
relation to maternity and parental benefits, Parliament pursuant to
section 91(2A), and the provincial legislatures pursuant to section
92(13). Justice Deschamps commented that “[t]he power of one level of
government to legislate in relation to one aspect of a matter takes
nothing away from the power of the other level to control another aspect
within its own jurisdiction.”42 But is concurrency really just a win-win
situation? Can we be so sanguine about the effects of shared jurisdiction
on the federal principle?
The de facto concurrency that results from overlapping legislative
powers has the potential advantage of permitting the expression of
democratic will by either or both levels of government. This democratic
advantage, however, comes at some risk to the federal principle. As
discussed in Part V below, the Court has expanded its definition of the
circumstances that give rise to federal paramountcy, thus making it
possible for the federal Parliament to choose to block the operation of
provincial laws in areas of shared jurisdiction. Moreover, even if
Parliament chooses not to assert the primacy of its legislative policies,
the passage of federal legislation may have the effect of ousting
provincial jurisdiction as a matter of practical political realities. For
example, the Quebec government’s ability to pursue a distinct maternity
and parental benefits program would have been severely limited if the
federal government had insisted that the federal program must operate
equally in Quebec, as it could have following the Court’s ruling in the
Employment Insurance Reference. The jurisprudence empowers
Parliament to transform areas of concurrent jurisdiction into areas of de
facto federal exclusivity. Thus, while Deschamps J.’s generous and
dynamic interpretation of federal power advances the democratic
principle by giving federal and provincial legislatures alike the

42

Id., at para. 8.
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flexibility to respond to new social needs, its implications for the federal
principle are more problematic.
The Employment Insurance Reference affirmed the legal capacity of
the federal Parliament to legislate a national scheme of maternity and
parental benefits. Provincial governments interested in pursuing distinct
policies could do so only if they succeeded in persuading the federal
government to move aside in the name of provincial autonomy.
Fortunately, from the point of view of the federal principle, Quebec has
sufficient political power to extract concessions from the federal
government in areas of shared jurisdiction, concessions that can then
operate to the advantage of other interested provinces. In the period
between the Quebec Court of Appeal and Supreme Court rulings, the
Quebec and federal governments concluded an agreement whereby
Quebec will operate its own Parental Insurance Plan which will provide
maternity and parental benefits to Quebec claimants in lieu of the
similar benefits in the Employment Insurance Act.43 Despite the legal
potential for federal dominance created by the Court’s ruling, the
politics of Canadian federalism made room for the accommodation of
Quebec’s ability to pursue distinct social policies.
2. Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings
At issue in Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings44 (the “Lego v. MegaBloks
case”) was the constitutional validity of the “passing off” action in
section 7(b) of the Trade-marks Act. In upholding section 7(b) as a valid
exercise of federal jurisdiction pursuant to the “general regulation of
trade” branch of the trade and commerce power in section 91(2) of the
Constitution Act, 1867, the Court did not purport to expand the scope of
federal jurisdiction. Rather, it simply applied the principles set out in

43

To enable the legislative implementation of the agreement with Quebec, in 2005
Parliament added s. 23(3.5) to the Employment Insurance Act, providing that federal parental
benefits will be reduced or eliminated where “benefits are payable to a claimant … for the same
reasons under a provincial law …”. S.C. 1996, c. 23, s. 23, as amended by S.C. 2005, c. 30, s. 130.
The Act already included a similar provision — s. 22(3) — permitting distinct provincial
approaches to the provision of maternity benefits.
44
Supra, note 13. I should acknowledge that I appeared as counsel for the respondent
Ritvik Holdings (Mega Bloks), unsuccessfully arguing against the constitutional validity of s. 7(b)
of the Trade-marks Act. The reader may be justified in dismissing the comments that follow as sour
grapes.
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General Motors of Canada v. City National Leasing,45 the only other
case in the modern era to result in legislation being upheld pursuant to
the general regulation of trade power. However, the Court’s approach to
the potential breadth of the general regulation of trade power was far
less cautious in 2005 than it was in 1989. The Court in Kirkbi was
cavalier in authorizing overlapping federal legislation regarding local
trade and the creation of civil causes of action, matters that according to
section 92(13) fall within exclusive provincial jurisdiction. Thus,
beneath the surface appearance of simple fidelity to precedent, the
Kirkbi ruling is as strong an indication of the Court’s willingness to
interpret federal powers expansively as the more candid reasoning in the
Employment Insurance Reference and the Same-Sex Marriage
Reference.
Chief Justice Dickson in the General Motors case established five
criteria to guide the determination of whether federal legislation that
regulates local trade may nevertheless, in pith and substance, be in
relation to the general regulation of trade: (i) the impugned legislation
must be part of a regulatory scheme; (ii) the scheme must be
monitored by the continuing oversight of a regulatory agency; (iii) the
legislation must be concerned with trade as a whole rather than with a
particular industry; (iv) the legislation should be of a nature that
provinces jointly or severally would be constitutionally incapable of
enacting; and (v) the failure to include one or more provinces or
localities in a legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful
operation of the scheme in other parts of the country.46 In General
Motors, the Court had no difficulty concluding that the Combines
Investigation Act (now the Competition Act) satisfied these criteria
and thus was a valid exercise of federal jurisdiction. Similarly, LeBel
J. found it evident that the Trade-marks Act, the constitutional
validity of which had not previously been affirmed, also satisfied the
criteria for a valid exercise of the general regulation of trade power.47
More controversial was whether section 7(b) could also be held to
be constitutionally valid because of a sufficiently strong connection to
the regulatory scheme in the Trade-marks Act as a whole. Looked at in
isolation, section 7(b) is clearly unconstitutional. Section 7(b) codifies

45
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[1989] S.C.J. No. 28, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641.
Id., at 662-63, as summarized by LeBel J. in Kirkbi, supra, note 13, at para. 17.
Supra, note 13, at paras. 28-31.
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common law and civil law principles of liability and extends them on a
national basis. It creates a statutory civil action that can be pursued in
the Federal Court for losses resulting from a person directing “public
attention to his wares, services or business in such a way as to cause or
be likely to cause confusion in Canada … with the wares, services or
business of another”.48 The creation of civil actions is a matter within
exclusive provincial jurisdiction pursuant to section 92(13) of the
Constitution Act, 1867. As the Court stated in General Motors, and
reiterated in Kirkbi, “this provincial power over civil rights is a
significant power and one that is not lightly encroached upon”.49 The
question, then, was whether section 7(b) is closely connected to a public
scheme of national economic regulation, or whether it creates a freestanding national private tort action in violation of exclusive provincial
jurisdiction.
This question was much easier to answer regarding the civil remedy
at issue in General Motors. The civil action in the Combines
Investigation Act supplemented public mechanisms of oversight and
enforcement. Chief Justice Dickson’s judgment devotes a great deal of
attention to the presence of a scheme of public regulation operating
under the oversight of a regulatory agency, and the enlistment of private
enforcement through civil causes of action as an ancillary aspect of the
scheme.
In contrast, the pith and substance of the scheme of regulation in the
Trade-marks Act, operating under the oversight of the Registrar of
Trade-marks, is the maintenance and operation of a trade-mark registry,
and the ensuing efficient enforcement of registered trade-mark rights on
a national basis through an infringement action. Section 7(b) has no
significance for the holders of registered trade-marks; it is redundant in
the face of the more powerful infringement action available to them.
The significance of section 7(b) is that it permits the holders of
unregistered trade-marks, defined by common law and civil law rules
falling within exclusive provincial jurisdiction, to bring passing-off
actions in Federal Court that could lead to the issuance of a remedy
enforceable on a national basis. Apart from section 7, unregistered
trade-marks are not protected by the regulatory scheme; the oversight of
the Registrar of Trade-marks does not relate to them. In short, section

48
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Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, s. 7(b).
General Motors, supra, note 45, at 672-73; Kirkbi, supra, note 13, at para. 23.
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7(b) does not appear to have any connection to a public scheme of
national economic regulation.
It was for this reason that another provision of the same section was
declared invalid by the Court in MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd.50 The
Court held that section 7(e) constituted an invasion of exclusive
provincial jurisdiction in relation to property and civil rights, and had no
connection to the regulatory scheme set out in the Trade-marks Act. As
Laskin C.J. wrote for the majority:
One looks in vain for any regulatory scheme in s. 7, let alone
s. 7(e). Its enforcement is left to the chance of private redress without
public monitoring by the continuing oversight of a regulatory agency
which would at least lend some colour to the alleged national or
Canada-wide sweep of s. 7(e). … Even on the footing of being
concerned with practices in the conduct of trade, its private
enforcement by civil action gives it a local cast because it is as
applicable in its terms to local or intraprovincial competitors as it is to
competitors in interprovincial trade.51

The absence of regulatory oversight, or of any connection to a
public scheme of national economic regulation, is equally true regarding
section 7(b). The only difference is that, unlike section 7(e), section 7(b)
shares with the rest of the Act the subject matter of trade-marks and the
policy of protecting the holders of trade-marks from others trading on
their goodwill through the use of confusing marks. But this shared
subject matter and policy should not be constitutionally significant.
After all, trade-marks, unlike patents and copyrights, are not a federal
head of power. The Trade-marks Act is valid only because it consists, in
pith and substance, of a public scheme of national economic regulation
that differentiates it from regulation of local trade and the creation of
civil causes of action. Otherwise, federal regulation of trade-marks
would not be lifted out of provincial jurisdiction in relation to “property
and civil rights” and into federal jurisdiction over the general regulation
of trade. To be valid, therefore, section 7(b) has to be closely connected
to that public scheme of regulation, not to the subject matter or policy of
trade-marks writ large. The definition and protection of unregistered
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[1976] S.C.J. No. 60, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134.
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trade-mark rights remains a matter of exclusive provincial jurisdiction
pursuant to section 92(13).52
Furthermore, the civil action in General Motors was limited by its
terms to the enforcement of the public prohibitions in the Combines
Investigation Act. In other words, it was a new federal statutory tort. In
contrast, section 7(b) is a simple codification and extension on a
national basis of well-established common law and civil law principles
of tortious responsibility. In this light, LeBel J.’s conclusions that
section 7(b) is “limited in its application” and represents a minimal
intrusion on exclusive provincial jurisdiction are hard to understand.53
Section 7(b) does not make any reference to trade-marks or to other
provisions of the Trade-marks Act. When LeBel J. comments that the
purpose of section 7(b) “is to enforce the substantive aspects of the
Trade-marks Act relating to unregistered trade-marks”,54 he is engaged
in an unspecified degree of “reading down” of the general language of
the provision and finding connections with the rest of the Act that are at
best obscure.55
In short, the Court’s analysis leading to the upholding of section
7(b) pursuant to the general regulation of trade power was remarkably

52

See Hugues Richard, “De la constitutionallité de l’alinéa 7(b) de la Loi sur les marques
de commerce” (1988-89) 1 Les Cahiers de propriété intellectuelle 229, at 232 : “Une marque non
enregistrée existe en vertu des dispositions du droit civil au Québec et de la common law dans les
autres provinces. Sa naissance, sa subsistence et son extinction dépendent du droit provincial
applicable dans chaque province. Quant à nous, une marque de commerce non enregistrée existe
complètement à l’extérieur du SYSTÈME DE RÉGLEMENTATION établi par le Parlement dans
l’exercice de sa competence à l’égard des marques de commerce.”
53
Kirkbi, supra, note 13, at paras. 26 and 27.
54
Id., at para. 25.
55
The lack of a strong connection between s. 7(b) and the trade-marks registration scheme
that is the pith and substance of the Act is confirmed by the legislative history of s. 7. When
Parliament originally enacted a trade-mark registration scheme in 1868, the civil action in the
federal statute could be invoked only to prevent the unauthorized use of registered trade-marks.
With the passage of s. 11 of the Unfair Competition Act in 1932 (the precursor to the present s. 7 of
the Trade-marks Act), Parliament enacted prohibitions that extended beyond the use of registered
trade-marks for the first time. The legislative debates in 1932 make clear that Parliament’s purpose
in enacting s. 11 was not to bolster or otherwise support the existing regulatory scheme for
registered trade-marks. Rather, relying principally on its assumed power to implement Canada’s
international treaties, Parliament’s purpose was to create more general statutory prohibitions on
unfair competition in accordance with Canada’s obligations pursuant to Article 10 bis of the
International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as revised at The Hague in
1925. See House of Commons Debates (1932) at 11-12, 162, 2541-2; Senate Debates (1932) at 419.
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deferential to Parliament56 and suggests that the Court may be open to
further expansion of federal jurisdiction over economic regulation in the
future.

IV. EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF PROVINCIAL POWERS
In 2005, the Supreme Court rejected three challenges to the operation or
application of valid provincial statutes,57 and upheld three provincial
statutes from challenges to their validity on division of powers
grounds.58 The Court’s decisions upholding the validity of provincial
statutes did not require the development of new legal doctrine or the
bold expansion of provincial heads of power as we saw regarding
federal powers in the Employment Insurance Reference and the Kirkbi
case. The Court has generously interpreted provincial jurisdiction, but it
has not been eloquent in its recent decisions about the importance of
respecting provincial autonomy. The Court has simply interpreted wellestablished principles in a manner that has been favourable to provincial
legislative jurisdiction. In particular, the Court has used the pith and
substance doctrine and its corollary, the incidental effects doctrine, to
uphold provincial statutes so long as they have had a strong connection
to a matter within provincial jurisdiction. The fact that these statutes
also had substantial impact on matters outside of jurisdiction was
characterized as incidental, irrelevant for the purposes of constitutional
validity.
1. UL Canada v. Quebec
For example, in UL Canada Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney General),59 at
issue was the constitutional validity of a Quebec regulation prohibiting
the sale of yellow margarine in the province. The regulation serves the
interests of the dairy industry, which is anxious to protect butter from

56
No doubt part of the explanation for the Court’s apparently casual treatment of the
constitutional issue in Kirkbi was the lack of a jurisdictional conflict behind the constitutional
argument. Indeed, the Quebec Attorney General was the only provincial Attorney General to
intervene at the Supreme Court and it did so in support of the constitutional validity of s. 7(b).
57
Notes 15 to 17, supra.
58
Notes 18 to 20, supra.
59
[2005] S.C.J. No. 11, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 143.
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the spread of margarine.60 UL Canada, a subsidiary of Unilever, which
controls more than one-half of the margarine market in Quebec,
imported yellow margarine into Quebec with the purpose of initiating a
legal challenge to the regulation. The Quebec courts upheld the validity
of the regulation, as did the Supreme Court, dismissing the appeal in a
short oral decision delivered at the hearing without having to hear
Quebec’s submissions. Justice LeBel, stating the opinion of the Court,
dispensed with the division of powers’ argument in two sentences:
The appellant [UL Canada] has not shown that this Court should
intervene to reverse the judgments of the courts below. Based on the
constitutional principles governing the division of legislative powers,
the impugned regulatory provision is within the limits of the
provinces’ legislative authority over local trade.61

One wonders why the Court granted leave, and stated four
constitutional questions, when it ended up having so little to say about
the result. To find a more sustained description of the scope and
importance of provincial jurisdiction in relation to local trade, one must
turn to the reasons of the Quebec Court of Appeal62 (which presumably
the Supreme Court agreed with, although LeBel J. did not say so
explicitly).
UL had argued that the pith and substance of the regulation was in
relation to international trade since it prevented foreign manufacturers of
yellow margarine from selling their product in the province. UL was
continuing a half-century-long constitutional struggle to legalize the sale
of margarine in Canada. In the Margarine Reference, the Supreme Court
held that a federal law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of
margarine, which also had the purpose of protecting the dairy industry,
was ultra vires.63 The regulation of the manufacture and sale of
margarine fell within provincial jurisdiction. The Court upheld the
validity of one provision of the federal law, the prohibition on
the importation of margarine. The Quebec government responded to the
Court’s 1948 opinion by promptly passing its own law prohibiting
the sale and manufacture of margarine in the province. The Quebec law
60

“Low-fat spat”, The Economist, March 28, 2002.
Supra, note 59, at para. 1.
62
[2003] J.Q. No. 13505, 234 D.L.R. (4th) 398 (C.A.).
63
Reference re: Validity of Section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act, [1949] S.C.R. 1, affd
[1951] A.C. 179 (P.C.) (sub nom. Canadian Federation of Agriculture v. Attorney-General for
Quebec).
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has since evolved into a prohibition only on margarine that looks like
butter.
The Quebec regulation prohibiting the sale of yellow margarine at
issue in UL Canada makes no distinction between imported and locally
produced margarine. UL Canada argued that the regulation’s impact on
imported products constituted an invasion of federal jurisdiction in
relation to international trade. Emboldened by Supreme Court decisions
in the 1990s that gave decisive weight to the unwritten structural
principles of the constitution,64 UL Canada also argued that the
regulation violated the principle, allegedly inherent in the structure of
federalism, that goods, regardless of colour, should be able to move
freely across borders.
The Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed each of these arguments.
Since the Court found that the legislative purpose of the regulation is to
protect the Quebec dairy industry, rather than to restrict the sale of an
imported product, the Court concluded that the regulation’s pith and
substance relates to local trade, a matter within provincial jurisdiction
pursuant to section 92(13). Relying on Supreme Court decisions that
had upheld provincial jurisdiction over marketing and consumer
protection,65 and distinguishing those that did not,66 the Court of Appeal
found that the negative effects of the regulation that fall primarily on
foreign manufacturers are “incidental” to the regulation’s dominant
purpose.67
As for the argument that the free movement of goods across borders
is a binding principle of the federal system, the Quebec Court of Appeal
rejected this submission as “ill-founded”.67a The Court noted that a
common market runs counter to federalism’s promotion of provincial
autonomy and diversity, quoting Bastarache and Iacobucci JJ.’s opinion
in Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson to that effect:

64

Hunt v. T&N plc, [1993] S.C.J. No. 125, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289; Provincial Judges
Reference, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3; Secession Reference, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61,
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
65
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Kellogg’s Co. of Canada, [1978] S.C.J. No. 5, [1978] 2
S.C.R. 211; Carnation Co. v. Quebec (Agricultural Marketing Board), [1968] S.C.J. No. 11, [1968]
S.C.R. 238.
66
Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Manitoba Egg and Poultry Assn., [1971] S.C.J. No. 63,
[1971] S.C.R. 689; Burns Foods v. Manitoba (Attorney General), [1975] S.C.J. No. 151, [1975] 1
S.C.R. 494.
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The federal structure of our Constitution authorizes the growth of
distinct systems of commercial regulation whose application is
inevitably defined “in terms of provincial boundaries” … This type of
economic legislation, and the growth of divergent regulatory regimes
in the provinces, is undoubtedly authorized by the Constitution.68

2. British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd.
A similarly generous approach to provincial jurisdiction is evident in the
Court’s decision in British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd.69 At issue
was the constitutional validity of the British Columbia Tobacco
Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act.70 The Act authorizes
an action by the provincial government against manufacturers of
tobacco products for the recovery of its health care expenditures
caused by tobacco-related disease. The Act also alters the common
law rules applicable in private tort actions to make it easier for
plaintiffs to recover damages for tobacco-related injuries. A coalition
of tobacco manufacturers challenged the constitutional validity of the
statute on a number of grounds. They argued that the Act is outside
the territorial limits on provincial powers because it targets companies
mostly situate outside of the province and premised liability on
exposure to tobacco products even if that exposure occurred outside
of the province. The tobacco companies also argued that the Act
should be declared invalid on the grounds that it violates the rule of
law and judicial independence, two unwritten foundational norms of
the Constitution to which the Court has attributed binding force.
Section 92(13) confers on the provinces exclusive jurisdiction to
make laws in relation to “property and civil rights in the province”. The
creation of civil causes of action is a matter that falls within section
92(13). Since the Act deals with civil liability and civil procedure, it is
clearly in relation to “property and civil rights”. The more difficult issue
is whether it can also be said that the Act is in relation to rights that are
situate “in the province”. At trial, Holmes J. thought not. He declared
the Act ultra vires on the grounds that it exceeded the territorial
limitations on provincial powers. Justice Holmes found the pith and
substance of the Act to be the pursuit of the national and international
68
69
70

[1998] S.C.J. No. 78, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157, at 198.
[2005] S.C.J. No. 50, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473.
S.B.C. 2000, c. 30.
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tobacco industry to recover B.C.’s health care costs incurred as a result
of people’s exposure to tobacco products, wherever that exposure
occurred. Given the national and international nature of the tobacco
industry, and the substantial exposure B.C. residents have had to
tobacco products outside of the province, Holmes J. concluded that the
extraterritorial effects of the Act were “substantial”; they could not be
treated as minor or incidental.71
In unanimous decisions, the B.C. Court of Appeal and Supreme
Court of Canada disagreed, concluding that the extraterritorial effects of
the legislation were incidental to its main purpose. Justice Major,
writing a succinct and forceful unanimous opinion for the Supreme
Court, stated that a civil cause of action will be “in the province” if it
has a “meaningful connection” to the province and does not interfere
with the legislative sovereignty of other jurisdictions.72 Because the
cause of action that is the pith and substance of the Act relates to
recovery of “expenditures incurred by the B.C. government for the
health care of British Columbians”, Major J. had no difficulty
concluding that the Act had a meaningful connection to B.C. and did not
intrude on legislative jurisdiction elsewhere. “[N]o territory”, he wrote,
“could possibly assert a stronger relationship to that cause of action than
British Columbia.”73 As for the fact that the Act captures breaches of
duty and exposure to tobacco products outside of the province, Major J.
dismissed these extraterritorial effects of the Act as “subsidiary”,
“irrelevant to the Act’s validity”.74
Justice Major’s opinion is a textbook example of the generous use
of the pith and substance doctrine and ancillary effects doctrine to
enable the creative deployment of provincial legislative jurisdiction in
response to new social and economic circumstances. In Imperial
Tobacco, it was not necessary to resort to the living tree metaphor to
permit growth and expansion of provincial powers, as the Court did for
federal powers in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference and the
Employment Insurance Reference. But the effect of Major J.’s
methodology is the same — constitutional flexibility in the service of
democracy.
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The result in Imperial Tobacco was perhaps not surprising given the
absence of any jurisdictional conflict behind the litigation. Other
provinces are interested in passing similar legislation, and the Attorney
General of Canada chose not to intervene. The Court’s ruling evinces a
healthy skepticism of attempts by private actors to use division of
powers arguments — and unwritten constitutional principles75 — to
avoid regulation contrary to their interests.
3. Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland
A similar skepticism characterized the Court’s dismissal of the
challenge to Quebec chicken marketing legislation in Fédération des
producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland.76 At issue was an
interlocking federal-provincial marketing scheme for chickens that had
been enacted following the agricultural products marketing “blueprint”77
approved by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1978 Egg Reference78
(in Canada, the answer to the question “which came first, the chicken or
the egg case?”, is clear).
Canadian governments have long sought to ensure a dependable
supply of agricultural products for consumers and price support for
producers through the enactment of marketing schemes. Divided
jurisdiction over the regulation of trade has posed a challenge to the
design of effective schemes. This challenge can be overcome through
the enactment of interlocking federal and provincial legislation, coupled
with the use of administrative delegation and referential incorporation,
to give one body, in this case the Fédération des producteurs de
volailles, complete jurisdiction over production and marketing.
Pelland, a Quebec farmer, produces chickens for sale in Ontario. He
exceeded his quota imposed by the Fédération by almost 4.5 million
kilograms. In response to legal action taken against him by the
Fédération, he argued that the Quebec legislation could not apply to
production destined solely for extraprovincial trade. The Quebec courts

75

As Major J. wrote, “… in a constitutional democracy such as ours, protection from
legislation that some might view as unjust or unfair properly lies not in the amorphous underlying
principles of our Constitution, but in its text and the ballot box.” Id., at para. 66.
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Id., at para. 2.
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and the Supreme Court dismissed his argument. Justice Abella, writing
for a unanimous Court, strongly supported a scheme that, in her words,
“reflects and reifies Canadian federalism’s constitutional creativity and
cooperative flexibility”.79 She gave two reasons for upholding the
application of the Quebec legislation to Mr. Pelland.
First, liberally using the pith and substance doctrine as the Court did
in UL Canada and Imperial Tobacco, she concluded that the pith and
substance of the Quebec legislation was the regulation of agricultural
production, a matter within provincial jurisdiction. In her view, the
purpose of the Act was not the control of extraprovincial trade, and its
effects on extraprovincial trade were incidental.80 Justice Abella
emphasized that overlapping jurisdiction is inevitable and tolerable in a
federal state, hence the need to focus on the core character of the
impugned legislation to determine validity. It followed that the Quebec
legislation could apply to Mr. Pelland’s production of its own force,
without any federal assistance.
Second, in any case, the federal delegation of jurisdiction over
extraprovincial trade to the Fédération was valid and provided a further
reason why Mr. Pelland must submit to the production quota imposed
on him. Justice Abella’s concluding comments are strongly supportive
of the legal architecture of cooperative federalism put in place in 1978:
I see no principled basis for disentangling what has proven to be a
successful federal-provincial merger. Because provincial governments
lack jurisdiction over extraprovincial trade in agricultural products,
Parliament authorized the creation of federal marketing boards and the
delegation to provincial marketing boards of regulatory jurisdiction
over interprovincial and export trade. Each level of government
enacted laws and regulations, based on their respective legislative
competencies, to create a unified and coherent regulatory scheme. The
quota system is an attempt to maintain an equilibrium between supply
and demand and attenuate the inherent instability of the markets. To
achieve this balance, it cannot exempt producers who seek to avoid
production control limits by devoting all or any of their production to
extraprovincial trade.81
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V. EXPANDING APPROACH TO PARAMOUNTCY
Given the Court’s tendency to uphold challenged statutes by interpreting
federal and provincial heads of power generously, thus permitting the
growth of de facto areas of concurrent jurisdiction, it becomes
increasingly important to the federal balance of powers for the Court to
affirm a limited definition of conflict that gives rise to federal
paramountcy. Paramountcy is the federal government’s trump card. A
broad definition of when it can be put in play stacks the deck of
cooperative federalism too strongly in the direction of the federal
government.82 It empowers Parliament to oust provincial legislatures’
ability to pursue distinct policies in areas of overlapping jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, during the same time period that the Court has practised
“considerable circumspection”83 when invited to use declarations of
ultra vires to police the division of powers, it has adopted a broader
definition of the kinds of conflict that will give rise to federal
paramountcy. The result is the potential for the exclusive reign of
federal legislative policy choices in areas of shared jurisdiction. The
simultaneous expansion of concurrency and paramountcy poses a
serious threat to the federal principle in Canada. It puts provincial
autonomy at the mercy of federal forbearance.
1. Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan
The Court’s 2005 ruling on the paramountcy rule, Rothmans, Benson &
Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan,84 is a significant consolidation and
restatement of the revised approach the Court has followed since 1990.
There is no need to discuss the decision at any length here, as Peter
Hogg has described its significance with his usual clarity in his
contribution to this volume.85 The essence of the Court’s ruling is that it
confirms that the narrow “impossibility of dual compliance” test for
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conflict86 has been supplemented by, or absorbed into, a broader
“frustration of the federal legislative purpose” test.87 In the words of
Major J., writing for a unanimous Court in Rothmans,
… the overarching principle … is that a provincial enactment must not
frustrate the purpose of a federal enactment, whether by making it
impossible to comply with the latter or by some other means. In this
way, impossibility of dual compliance is sufficient but not the only test
for inconsistency.88

When adopting the impossibility of dual compliance test in 1982,
Dickson J. justified his choice by reference to the value of provincial
autonomy.89 Now, the focus has shifted from protecting provincial
autonomy to promoting the primacy of federal policy objectives. This is
a significant normative shift, one that has been introduced by the Court
with no discussion of the values that have driven its choice or of the
consequences that might ensue. This is unfortunate, for as Zoe Oxaal
puts it,
… no matter where one sits in debates on federalism, when changes to
the balance of the federal system come about through incremental
changes in the jurisprudence, then they ought to be closely scrutinized,
just as we would scrutinize proposed constitutional amendments.
Federalism is the blueprint of the Canadian constitutional structure,
and interpretive shifts in its doctrines, such as federal paramountcy,
have “profound implications ... for the balance of power in the federal
system.”90

As Peter Hogg’s paper discusses,91 in Rothmans the Supreme Court
concluded, reversing the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, that
Saskatchewan’s legislation prohibiting retail displays of tobacco
86
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products did not frustrate Parliament’s legislative purpose in permitting
such displays. The provincial right to pursue distinct legislative policies
reflecting local needs and desires thus prevailed in an area of shared
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Court’s approach does not augur well for
the future of the federal principle.
If federal policy objectives are treated as supreme, the exercise of
provincial autonomy in areas of shared jurisdiction is rendered entirely
dependent upon the will of the federal Parliament. If one of Parliament’s
policy objectives is to oust provincial legislation entirely from an area of
shared jurisdiction, then apparently all Parliament has to do is say so. In
essence the definition of conflict adopted by the Court transfers control
over the scope of the paramountcy rule from the judiciary to Parliament.
Consider Major J.’s response to Rothmans’ submission that Parliament
intended to oust provincial legislation from the regulation of retail
tobacco displays:
In my view, to impute to Parliament such an intention to “occup[y] the
field” in the absence of very clear statutory language to that effect
would be to stray from the path of judicial restraint in questions of
paramountcy that this Court has taken …92

With all due respect, the Court’s focus on the primacy of federal
legislative purposes is not the path of judicial restraint. Judicial restraint
was the result in Rothmans, but only because of Parliamentary restraint.
Parliament now decides whether overlapping provincial legislation can
operate in areas of shared jurisdiction.
No doubt the result in Rothmans was influenced by the Attorney
General’s intervention arguing that Parliament’s objective was not
frustrated by the Saskatchewan law. As Major J. explained at the end of
his opinion in Rothmans:
While the submissions of the federal government are obviously not
determinative of the legal question of inconsistency, there is precedent
from this Court for bearing in mind the other level of government’s
position in resolving federalism issues …93

Would provincial autonomy have prevailed in Rothmans if the
Attorney General of Canada had submitted that the Saskatchewan
provisions did frustrate Parliament’s legislative objective? It is difficult
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to say. We can say that it is increasingly important for provincial laws to
be aligned with federal legislative policies if they are to operate in areas
of overlapping jurisdiction. This is not good news for provincial
autonomy.

VI. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT, DEMOCRACY AND FEDERALISM
Judicial reluctance to issue rulings of ultra vires on federalism grounds, as
we witnessed on the part of the Supreme Court in 2005 — indeed for the
past two decades — has the laudable effect of maximizing the democratic
space available to Parliament and the provincial legislatures. Especially in
comparison to the anti-democratic tendencies of the “watertight
compartments” paradigm favoured by the courts at times in the past,94 the
Court’s commitment to giving both Parliament and the provincial
legislatures the benefit of the doubt should be applauded. It leaves the
resolution of federalism disputes primarily to intergovernmental
negotiations between politically accountable officials. Because of these
democratic advantages, and in light of the inherently subjective elements
of judicial review, many leading constitutional scholars — among them
Paul Weiler,95 Peter Hogg96 and David Beatty97 — have urged the Court to
exercise restraint when determining whether Parliament or a provincial
legislature has complied with the division of powers. These apostles of
restraint ought to be pleased with the Court’s apparent conversion to the
cause.
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It would be a mistake to think that the Court’s role in shaping the
law of federalism is only significant when it declares statutes invalid.
Whatever results it reaches, the Court’s decisions have an important
influence on the scope of governments’ powers and their respective
bargaining positions in intergovernmental negotiations. Moreover, the
restraint the Court has exercised regarding declarations of invalidity
over the past two decades has been matched over the same period by an
expansion of the test for conflict giving rise to federal paramountcy and
increased resort to the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine to restrict
the operation of provincial statutes. The combined effect of these trends
has been to increase the legal potential for federal dominance and
provincial subordination.98
Judicial restraint tends to expand areas of de facto concurrent power
in which the legislative policy choices of Parliament are paramount. The
federal principle holds that federal and provincial governments are
coordinate (equal in status) and autonomous within their respective
spheres of jurisdiction.99 Judicial interpretation that is faithful to the
federal principle will thus give equal weight to the claims of federal and
provincial autonomy.
Judicial restraint promotes the democratic principle by maximizing
the powers of democratically elected legislatures but compromises the
federal principle to the extent that it enlarges areas of concurrent power
in which the provinces are subordinate to overriding federal
jurisdiction.100 Because of the federal paramountcy rule, areas of
concurrent jurisdiction are not ones in which the provinces are equal in
status to the federal government. It has long been a theme of Québécois
scholarship on the Constitution that concurrent jurisdiction risks
producing provincial subordination rather than the equality of status that
is the hallmark of the federal principle.101 Reflecting this concern, Beetz
J. argued that provincial and federal jurisdiction should be kept “as far
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as possible in separate areas”102 to limit the “risk that these two fields of
exclusive powers will be combined into a single more or less concurrent
field of powers governed solely by the rule of paramountcy of federal
legislation. Nothing could be more directly contrary to the principle of
federalism underlying the Canadian Constitution.”103 As Henri Brun and
Eugénie Brouillet have argued, in areas of concurrent jurisdiction the
provinces are in a constitutionally precarious position, “à la merci de la
volonté fédérale”.104
In an era of judicial restraint, then, provincial legislative autonomy
is rendered increasingly dependent upon securing federal consent — or,
at least, federal forbearance. The provinces have only a conditional
autonomy within areas of de jure or de facto concurrent jurisdiction.
Rather than exercising guaranteed, exclusive jurisdiction, they are put in
the position of supplicants to the federal government. To secure
legislative space for the pursuit of distinct policy objectives, the
provinces must negotiate with a national government that is holding the
legal trump card — the federal paramountcy rule — in its hand.
Judicial restraint thus casts the primary responsibility for securing
the equal sovereignty of federal and provincial governments onto the
political sphere of intergovernmental negotiations. The degree of respect
accorded to the federal principle will depend on the vagaries of
intergovernmental politics. Fortunately, from the point of view of the
federal principle, the potential for federal dominance embedded in the
law of federalism has been curtailed by the strong centrifugal forces in
Canadian politics. As K.C. Wheare succinctly put it, the quasi-federal
elements of Canadian constitutional law are circumscribed by the
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strongly federal tendencies in Canadian politics.105 In other words, there
is a significant gap between the law of Canadian federalism and the
sociopolitical governing realities of the nation, a gap that has grown
substantially since Wheare published his study.
The quasi-federal elements of the Canadian constitutional text
identified by Wheare — such as the federal disallowance and
declaratory powers — remain legally unaltered. Attempts to amend the
Constitution to repeal or limit some of its quasi-federal aspects failed
with the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. The Supreme Court
has been unwilling to use the federal principle to constrain the legal
scope of the disallowance or declaratory powers.106 Instead, the Court
has placed its faith in politics to produce governing practices faithful to
the federal principle. As La Forest J. wrote regarding the federal
government’s abandonment of the disallowance power and infrequent
resort to the declaratory power:
It was not the courts but political forces that dictated their near demise.
… Their inappropriate use will always raise grave political issues,
issues that the provincial authorities and the citizenry would be quick
to raise. In a word, protection against abuse of these draconian powers
is left to the inchoate but very real and effective political forces that
undergird federalism.107

Just as the Court has placed its faith in the politics of federalism to
prevent abuse of the disallowance and declaratory powers, it may also
be confident that expansion of the legal potential for federal dominance
resulting from judicial interpretation of the division of powers carries
little risk for the federal principle in practice. Federal governments in
Canada pay a heavy political price for running roughshod over
provincial interests, even though they have a growing legal capacity to
do so. In areas of shared jurisdiction, the federal government is much
more likely to seek negotiated, mutually satisfactory solutions than it is
to impose federal priorities on the provinces. Indeed, even in areas of
exclusive federal jurisdiction, the federal government normally gives

105
K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, 4th ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) at
20: “… although the Canadian Constitution is quasi-federal in law, it is predominantly federal in
practice. Or, to put it another way, although Canada has not a federal constitution, it has a federal
government.”
106
See Reference re Power of Disallowance and Reservation, [1938] S.C.R. 71; Ontario
Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] S.C.J. No. 99, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327.
107
Ontario Hydro, id., at 372.

376

Supreme Court Law Review

(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d)

significant weight to provincial interests. The politics of a balanced and
cooperative federalism has prevailed over our quasi-federal constitutional
law.
Let me be clear about two points regarding the centralizing
possibilities created by the law of Canadian federalism. First of all, it is
nothing new. The potential for federal dominance exists in a number of
features of the Constitution Act, 1867, most notably in the federal
powers of disallowance and reservation. My point is simply that the
Court’s interpretation of the division of powers has done more to
expand the potential for federal dominance than it has to curtail it.
Second, the potential for federal dominance created by the constitutional
text and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the division of powers
has not been realized in contemporary political practice. Canadian
provinces are hardly legislatively hamstrung by an overbearing central
government. To the contrary, the provinces have expansive jurisdiction
over many important areas of social policy, including education, health
care and commercial regulation. In contemporary Canadian politics, the
provinces complain much less about limits on their legislative
jurisdiction than they do about a mismatch between their fiscal
resources and the breadth of their legislative responsibilities. In short,
the centralizing potential inherent in our constitutional law has long
been held in check by the decentralizing political forces present in the
federation.
In light of the powerful centrifugal forces at work in Canadian
politics, the Supreme Court’s tendency to adopt a posture of judicial
restraint in federalism cases, and to interpret both federal and provincial
heads of power expansively, may be defended as the best approach to
democracy and federalism in the Canadian context. The Court’s
approach maximizes the democratic space available for the exercise of
federal and provincial jurisdiction without posing an undue threat to the
federal principle in practice. It seems likely that if the political restraints
on Parliamentary interference with provincial autonomy were less
powerful, the Court might be much more cautious about interpreting
federal heads of power as broadly and flexibly as it has.
The risk of the Court’s approach to federalism is precisely the
degree to which it relies on political bargaining to secure adherence to
the federal principle. The political dynamics of Canadian federalism
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may not operate equitably for particular provinces.108 They may vary
across time or from issue to issue. Even when cooperative federalism is
working well, the continuing and growing gap between quasi-federal
law and political practices faithful to the federal principle may itself
have destabilizing effects for the federation. So long as the provincial
pursuit of distinct policies in the growing areas of shared jurisdiction is
conditional upon federal consent or forbearance, the provinces cannot be
confident that their autonomy will be safeguarded in the future. In these
circumstances, should we be surprised by the apparent paradox of
Canada being wracked by periodic existential crises despite the many
successes of cooperative federalism? Could it be that an important part
of the explanation for our continuing constitutional struggles is that the
provinces are so frequently cast in the role of supplicants to federal
power, negotiating with a legally dominant party for the right to pursue
distinct legislative policies?
It is perhaps not possible to be confident about the answers to such
questions. But if we take the federal principle seriously, if we value the
promotion and preservation of provincial diversity as much as national
unity, then there is a strong case for closing the gap between our quasifederal constitutional law and our federal political practices, especially
when it can be done without significantly limiting the totality of
democratic space available to Parliament and the provincial legislatures.
Steps in this direction could include returning to a narrow definition of
conflict for the purposes of the federal paramountcy rule; abandoning or
significantly reducing resort to the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine
to limit the application of provincial statutes; and exercising great
caution before allowing federal statutes or conditional federal spending
to intrude on areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction.109 The contrary
tendencies in the Court’s recent case law are cause for concern.
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